The Special Prosecutor yesterday released the report of an investigation that spanned nearly four years of labour, and
three words best capture the effort; lazy, shambolic and incompetent!
Apart from reading the judgments and setting out a synopsis of the facts as it could glean from the three judicial
decisions from three foreign courts, the only effort the Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) seems to have put in, was
speaking to the individuals reported to have been involved in the scandal.
Apart from that, the OSP did virtually nothing else in the nearly four year period. (The investigation was
commenced in February 2020 and concluded in June 2024)
Predictably, all the individuals involved denied any culpability, and the OSP seems to have left matters there,
choosing to transcribe, in boring detail, the rationalization of those individuals.
There was no effort at collaborating the narration in the judgments, with events in Ghana, which would have
established whether or not there was complicity.
The individuals who have been named as complicit in the Airbus matter are; John Dramani Mahama (Government
Official 1 by the UK court and Individual 1 by the US court), Samuel Adam Mahama and Samuel Adam Foster
(Intermediary 5 by the UK court and Consultant 4 by the US court), Philip Sean Middlemiss (Intermediary 6 by the
UK court and Consultant 5 by the US court), and Leanne Sarah Davis (Intermediary 7 by the UK court).
For instance, the OSP failed/refused to set out the relevant laws in the jurisdictions where Airbus SE as found guilty
of bribing Ghanaian officials, and setting out the relevant Ghanaian law and how it differs from the law in those
jurisdictions.
This would have helped to explain why the OSP stated that the laws in the countries where Airbus was found liable
are different from Ghana’s laws, and therefore inoperable here, and why our laws would not be effective in
prosecuting the named individuals.
The OSP also made no effort, at all, in tracing the banking records of the individuals involved, either locally or
internationally.
The OSP also failed to set out a timeline of activities and events, which would be crucial in such a scenario. For
instance, at which stages, during the process of procurement, did the events set out in the various judicial
pronouncements the OSP depended on, occur?
For instance, Point 4 of the OSP report (Investigation and Judicial Pronouncements by Relevant Foreign
Authorities) at pages 2 to 9 set out detailed fact sheets and times that three courts, one each in the United States of
America, the United Kingdom, and France, detailed facts, times and activities which, in the opinion of those three
courts, made Airbus SE culpable.
OSP’s investigation fails, woefully, to set out these facts, times and activities and how they correlate to facts, times
and activities that occurred in Ghana. The OSP report woefully fails to mention how it pursued any such
independent effort.
As an example point 4 of the report illustrates some points at pages 5 and 6 where it is stated;
“4.12 From 2009, Intermediary 5 and his associates worked on the sales to the Government of Ghana without any
written consultant agreement. This included liaison with Government Official 1 regarding the potential Airbus C-
295 sale. Intermediaries 5 and 6 submitted a report to Airbus which documented a January 2011 meeting in London
attended by themselves, Government Official 1 and Airbus at which the C-295 aircraft was agreed upon as the
most suitable aircraft for the needs of the Government of Ghana.
“4.13 By April 2011, Airbus employee 16 reported to his colleagues that the deal was close to being finalised. He
then asked Intermediaries 5 and 6 to transmit a letter to Government Official 1 and explain a possible delay. He
also asked them to secure meetings with the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance. On 18 May
2011, Intermediary 6 emailed Airbus employee 16 stating that Government Official I had taken the relevant
financials to the Minister of Finance and that Intermediaries 5 and 6 were planning to go to Ghana within the next
couple of weeks so they could oversee the project personally.
“4.14 Company D submitted a formal Business Partner application in May 2011. On 8 July 2011, Intermediary 6
sent Airbus employee 15 [senior] a [Company D] update. He reported that he had just returned from Ghana “having
had very productive meetings with all parties, including [Government Official 1], the [Ministry of Defence] and
Minister of Finance.” The email stated that the C-295 sale was agreed at all levels, and was expected to clear
Parliament by 14 July 2011, and that Government Official I had expressed an interest in buying two more C-295s.
“4.15 On 3 August 2011, Airbus’ Spanish Defence Subsidiary and the Government of Ghana signed a purchase
agreement for the sale of the two C-295 aircraft. The following day Airbus employee 17 [senior] (Airbus
Compliance) declared to the Spanish export credit agency that no more than 3,001,718.15 Euros would be paid to
Business Partners in connection with this contract. Although no payment had actually yet been made, this figure
broadly reflected a 5% commission. The same document also declared compliance with the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions.”
The above paragraphs set out detailed facts, times and activities that could easily have been corroborated by other
means. The OSP made no effort, none, in its report spanning about four years, to set out a timeline of events in
Ghana, which would have collaborated or obfuscated the above facts and time lines.
For instance, Former President Mahama admitted there was meeting in London he attended with some government
officials. Airbus in turn stated that there was a meeting attended by themselves, Government Official 1 and Airbus
at which the C-295 aircraft was agreed upon as the most suitable aircraft for the needs of the Government of
Ghana.” The question the OSP should have posed and answered was whether report submitted by Intermediaries 5
and 6 to Airbus corroborates Mr. Mahama’s claim that there was a meeting in London, but diverges on the
significant detail that Mahama was collaborating with Intermediaries 5 and 6. In this case, the OSP should have
confronted Mr. Mahama as to who was lying, the Airbus report, or Mahama’s self-serving rationalizations.
And this lapse occurs throughout the OSP report, where the OSP failed to use local facts to correspond and cross-
check the facts provided under its point 4 of the rulings from the three courts.
A shoddy work indeed, and the question would be at what cost to Ghana?
